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III.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of the Case

This is an appeal from the Opinion and Order on Appeal from the District Court of the
Seventh Judicial District of the State ofldaho, in and for the County of Bonneville in which the
Hon. Judge Bruce L. Pickett, affirmed the Magistrate Courts assessment of attorney fees in the
amount of $11,559.05.

B.

Statement of Facts and Course of Proceeding Below

The will of Ruth Birch was probated in late 2011. It named two of her four living
children, Barry Birch (Barry) and Linda Bailey (Linda) as heirs and it disinherited Bruce Birch
(Appellant) and Cheryl Simmons (Cheryl), the two younger siblings. Linda was appointed
personal representative (PR). The estate consisted of real property and cash. A compromise
agreement entered by the parties provided for an equal division of the Estate between the four
siblings. The Agreement was approved by the Court.
Barry died in May 2014 while the Estate was pending. The Appellant inherited Barry's
interest in the Estate thereby increasing his interest in the estate from 25% to 50%. In 2016, the
PR filed Petition for Order of Complete Settlement, to DetermineTestacy, to Approval Final

Accounting and Distribution, and to Discharge Personal Representative to close the Estate
seeking, an1ong other things, an order requiring Appellant to reimburse the Estate for legal fees
previously incurred by the Estate. For the purpose of this Appeal, the Estate's recovery of legal
fees is the sole issue. Appellant filed an objection to the petition on a number of grounds,
supported by memorandum. The PR filed a responsive brief arguing that the Court had equitable

APPELLANT'S BRIEF - I

authority to assess legal fees against the distributive share of an heir. Oral argument was
presented to the Court On August 18, 2016, the Court entered its Order Granting in Substantial

Part the Personal Representative 's Petition For Orders Filed. The Court concluded and found
at pp 4-5, as follows:
First, the Court has equitable powers in any proceedings to contest the probate of a will.
Pederson v. Moore, 32 Idaho 420 (1919). The Idaho Supreme Court in 1996 reiterated
the equitable powers of the Court in a probate case. Ko/ouch v. First Security Bank of
Idaho, 128 Idaho 186 ( 1996). In the context of the PR 's claim to assess attorney's fees
against Bruce Birch's interest in the estate, upon evidence of unnecessary or excessive
litigation pursued by Mr. Birch, the Court has equitable power to assess fees against
his interest in the estate. (Emphasis added).

No evidentiary hearing was held in this case. The PR presented no evidence of
"um1ecessary or excessive litigation" to the Court. Each of the PR's assertions were denied and
remain unproven at that time. Not withstanding those facts, the Court "assessed" legal fees
against Appellant in the amount of $10,314.50.
Appellant filed a motion to reconsider supported by memorandum citing Idaho appellate
cases which hold that Idaho judges do not have equitable authority to award attorney fees. The

PR filed an opposing memorandum asserting that Needam v. Needam, 34 Idaho 193 (1921) had
not been overturned and that the holding of the case supported the Court's equitable assessment
of legal fees. Although Appellant requested oral argument, his request for a hearing was denied
by the Court.
The Court denied the motion to reconsider citing Needam as authority and specifically
asserting that the cases cited in its August, 2016 order authorizing an equitable assessment of
legal fees against the Appellant. In the order, the Hon. Judge L. Mark Riddoch stated that

Needham is consistent with modem law but did not analyze or contrast it with the cases cited in
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Appellant's memorandum.
The PR's attorney filed a memorandum offees and costs (Memorandum) in September,
2016. Appellant did not object to it, because the Estate had not been determined by the Court to
be a prevailing party, the Estate had not filed a motion for an award of fees and because the
Memorandum failed to state a contractual or statutory basis for an award of fees. The Court did
not enter an order awarding fees or costs to the Estate in the amounts set forth in the Estate's
Memorandum.
The PR submitted a proposed Closing Order and Schedule Qf Distribution (Closing
Order herein) included was an offset of Appellant's interest in the estate in the amount of
$11,559.05, a dollar amount which wa<; not earlier identified, requested or ordered. There is no
record in the Court file that a copy of the proposed Closing Order was served on Appellant when
it was lodged with the Court. It was, however, emailed to Appellant's personal email address by
Driscol]. The Court signed the Closing Order and entered it on October 20, 2016. The Schedule
of Distribution offset Appellant's distributive share of the Estate in the amount of $10,413.50, as

initially ordered by the Magistrate as well as by an addition $10,521.00 leaving Appellant
indebted to his sisters, Linda and Cheryl, in the amount of approximately $4,320.00 each.
Appellant filed a Motion to Reconsider, or Alternatively Motion to Set Aside Pursuant to
Rule 60(b) on November 2, 2016. On November 9, 2016, Appellant filed an Amended Motion To
Reconsider, or Alternatively Motion To Set Aside Pursuant to Rule 60(b). Appellant's
Memorandum in Support ofAmended Motion To Reconsider, or Alternatively Motion To Set
Aside Pursuant to Rule 60(b) was filed on November 9, 2016. Copies of all referenced pleadings

were served on the PR's attorney, Driscoll, and upon Cheryl Simmons. No objection to
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Appellant's motions's to reconsider were filed by Bailey, her attorney, or Simmons.
On November 29, 2016, Appellant filed a Second Amended Motion To Reconsider and
served the above-nan1ed parties. Later that day, the Court entered Order Denying Motion To

Reconsider, or Alternatively to Set Aside Pursuant to Rule 60(b) and Order Denying Motion to
Disqualify. On December 29, 2016, the Court entered its Order Denying Second Motion For
Reconsideration and/or Set Aside. Bailey submitted a proposed judgment to the Magistrate in
late December, 2016 seeking entry of judgment against Appellant for the amount set forth in the
Closing Order. An objection to entry of the proposed Judgment was filed. The Magistrate did
not schedule a hearing on the objection but instead entered the Judgment as proposed. The
following day Appellant appealed to the District Court from the Closing Order, from denial of
his motions to reconsider and from the Judgment entered in January 2017.
On March 23, 2017, the Magistrate filed his Supplemental Order Re: Attorney Fees
(Supplemental Order) in which on Page 1 he acknowledged that he did not have equitable
authority to award attorney fees.
Oral arguments were heard before the District Court, before the Hon. Judge Bruce L.
Pickett, on June 1, 2017. Appellant argued that the Magistrate's equitable assessment of fees
was erroneous and that the inclusion in the Closing Order of those sums set forth in the
Memorandum filed by the Estate was procedurally defective. Appellant also argued that the
Judgment entered by the Magistrate against the Appellant was defective. Although the Magistrate
had acknowledged that the Court did not have equitable authority to assess legal fees, the PR
argued before Judge Pickett that the Magistrate did in fact have equitable authority to assess fees
and cited Needham, supra, as authority. The PR argued that Appellant's failure to object to the
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Memorandum was a total and complete waiver to any later objection to recovery of the fees and
costs claimed therein. On July 5, 2017 an Opinion and Order on Appeal was issued in which
Judge Pickett found that the Magistrate did not have equitable authority to assess legal fees
against Appellant's interest in the Estate. Judge Pickett set aside the Judgment entered against
Appellant. Judge Pickett did find, however, "Judge Riddoch's award of $11,559.05 is affirmed."

Id at Page 6.
On August 14, 2017 Appellant filed this appeal.

IV.

ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
A.

THE MAGISTRATE COURT DID NOT AWARD THE ESTATE ATTORNEY
FEES OR COSTS.

B. BECAUSE THE ESTATE HAD NO CONTRACTUAL OR STATUTORY BASIS
FOR AN AWARD OF LEGAL FEES, LEGAL FEES COULD NOT BE
A WARDED IN THIS CASE.

C.

V.

FAILURE TO OBJECT TO THE MEMORANDUM OF FEES AND COSTS IS
NOT A SUFFICIENT BASIS TO GRANT THE A WARDING OF ATTORNEY
FEES.

STANDARD OF REVIEW
"The determination whether to award attorney fees under [a] statute is discretionary with

the trial court and will not be overturned on appeal absent an abuse of discretion." Everett v.
Trunnell, 105 Idaho 787,791,673 P.2d 387, 391 (1983); United States Nat 'l Bank of Oregon v.

126 Idaho 733, 735, 889 P.2d 1123, 1125 (Ct.App. 1995).
" We consider: " ( 1) whether the trial court correctly perceived the issue as one of
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discretion; (2) whether the trial court acted within the outer boundaries of its discretion and
consistently with the legal standards applicable to the specific choices available to it; and (3)
whether the trial court reached its decision by an exercise of reason." Indian Springs LLC v.
Indian Springs Land Inv., LLC, 147 Idaho 737,215 P.3d 457 (2009); Lettunich v. Lettunich, 145

Idaho 746, 749, 185 P.3d 258,261 (2008).

VI.

ATTORNEY FEES ON APPEAL
Appellant is entitled to attorney's fees under Idaho Code§ 12-121, in that Bailey has

continually pursued and defended the Magistrate's Court erroneous assertion that it had equitable
authority to assess attorney fees against the Respondent. And without the foundational
requirement that such attorney fees be based on contract or statute, Bailey has frivolously
perpetuated this case to the Respondent's detriment and cost.

VII.

ARGUMENT

A.

THE MAGISTRATE COURT DID NOT AWARD THE EST ATE ATTORNEY FEES
OR COSTS
The Magistrate Court did not award attorney fees or costs to the Estate. The only order

entered by the Magistrate following Respondent's filing of its Memorandum was the Estate
Closing Order and Order of Distribution (Closing Order) signed and entered by the Magistrate,

on October 20, 2016. In that Order the Court directed Personal Representative to make
distributions of the estate assets. I.R.C.P. Rule 54(e)(6) reads in part, " ... after the time for
filing an objection has passed, the court must enter an order settling the dollar amount of
attorney fees,

if any, awarded to any party to the action." (Emphasis added) The Closing
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Order reads in part:

NOW THEREFORE, IT IS lIEREBY ORDERED AND DECREED
THAT:
1. The will of the decedent heretofore informally probated by the Court
is hereby formally probated in accordance with the will, the Order Approving
Compromise Agreement filed September 10, 2012, and subsequent proceedings
and orders herein.
2. The final account of Petitioner has been approved.
3. Petitioner is hereby authorized and directed to deliver and distribute
title and possession of the assets of the estate to the distributees in the amount and
the manner set forth in the annexed Schedule of Distribution, and all prior
distributions shown in the Amended Final Accounting are hereby approved ....

The Magistrate "authorized and directed" the Respondent to "deliver and distribute" the
assets of the estate. This order did not "settle the dollar amount", it did not award the Estate
legal fees and costs, and it did not enter an award of fees and costs against the Appellant. As
neither an order been entered settling the dollar amount of legal fees and costs, nor has an order
been entered awarding fees and eosts, the District Judge, acting in his appellate capacity, erred in
affirming an award of fees that was never made.
Respondent may attempt to argue that the copy of the Schedule of Distribution annexed
to the Closing Order qualifies as an "order" of the Magistrate. Such is not the case. The very
language of the document demonstrates that it is not.

"** This amount requires a payment from Bruce Birch instead of a
distribution from Bruce Birch to cover the $10,521.00 in attorney fees and
$144.85 in costs ... to which there was no timely objection and motion to
disallow filed, together with the $10,314.50 of Estate attorney fees assessed
against Bruce Birch in the court's Order filed August 18, 2016 ... " (Emphasis
Added.) Estate Closing Order and Order of Distribution, annexed Schedule of
Distribution. Footnote.
A simple and plain reading of the footnote shows the difference between the two amounts
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of attorney fees cited. The language pertaining to the first figure, $10,521.00 simply mentions
that no objection had been made by the Appellant. This language does not constitute an award of
attorney fees or eosts in the amount cited. This language does not comply with the provisions of
LR.C.P. Rule 54, specifically the requirements of LR.C.P 54(e)(6). The Estate was not awarded
$10,521.00. Appellant's decision not to object the Memorandum cannot be construed as an
entitlement to an assessment of legal fees.
The second sum mentioned, $10,314.50, were not awarded to the Estate. In his Order

Granting in Substantial Part the Personal Representative's Petition For Orders Filed filed
August 18, 2016, the Magistrate wrongfully concluded that he had equitable authority to assess
these sums against Appellant's interest in the Estate assets.

As the closing order states, these

sums were "assessed" against Appellant's estate interest. On appeal, Judge Pickett correctly
overturned that assessment.
The language of the Closing Order clearly indicates that the Magistrate assessed not only
$10,314.50 the Magistrate initially assessed against Appellant's interest in the Estate but the
$10,521.00 set forth in the PR's Memorandum as well. As there was no award of attorney fees,
the Magistrates inclusion of this sum in the Closing Order can only be construed as the
Magistrate's ongoing and wrongful exercise of equitable authority to assess legal fees against the
Appellant's interests in the assets of the Estate.
The Closing Order authorized the PR to distribute certain sums of money to heirs of the
Estate only after wrongfully assessing more than $20,000.00 against Appellant's interest in the
Estate.
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B.

BECAUSE THE ESTATE HAD NO CONTRACTUAL OR STATUTORY BASIS FOR
AN AW ARD OF LEGAL FEES, LEGAL FEES COULD NOT BE AW ARD ED IN THIS
CASE.

There exists no contractual or statutory basis for an award of attorney fees to the Estate.
"Idaho adheres to the "American Rule," which requires each party to pay its own attorney fees
unless otherwise provided by statute or contract." Mortenson v. Stewart Title Guar. Co., 235
P.3d 387,398, 149Idaho 437,448 (2010). LR.C.P. 54(e)(l) reads: "In any civil action
the court may award reasonable attorney fees, including paralegal fees, to the prevailing
party or parties as defined in Rule 54(d)(l)(B), when provided for by any statute or

contract." (Emphasis Added) Additionally, LR.C.P. 54(e)(4) states: "[a]ttorney fees,
when allowable by statute or contract, are costs in an action and processed in
the same manner as other costs and included in the memorandum of costs."(Emphasis Added).
These provisions of I.R.C.P. 54, as supported by case law, require that an award of
attorney fees must be statutorily or contractually based. "It is a general rule that attorney's fees
cannot be recovered in an action unless authorized bv statute or bv express agreement of the

parties." (Emphasis added) Barnes v. Hinton, 651 P.2d 553,554, 103 Idaho 619,620 (1982).
1. There does not exist a contractual basis for an awarding of attorney fees.
Simply stated, the issue of a contractual basis for an award of attorney fees is not present,
neither has a contractual basis been addressed or argued by either party as a basis for the
awarding of attorney fees. Additionally the District Com1 made the following finding.
In this case, the compromise agreement signed by the heirs to the estate was silent
concerning attorney fees; therefore, no contractual basis existed for the
assessment. Therefore the remaining basis for the assessment was statutory, and
not equitable. (Emphasis added) Opinion and Order on Appeal filed July 5, 2017,
Page 4 Section A
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Judge Pickett did not find any statutory basis for an award of fees.
2. There is no statutory basis for an awarding of attorney fees.
No order, entered by the Magistrate in this case, has cited any statute as authority
for either an award or an assessment oflegal fees. The Magistrate's assertion that he had
equitable authority to assess legal fees lacked any legal basis and contradicted existing
case law in this State. The Magistrate routinely denied each motion for reconsideration
filed by the Appellant, citing equitable authority as a basis for the assessment. Judge
Pickett's appellate order stated: "As Judge Riddoch correctly acknowledged in his
Supplemental Order, he did not have equitable authority to assess $10,314.50 against
Appellant's interest in the estate. See Golder v. Golder, l 10 Idaho 57,61, 714 P.2d 26,30
(1986)." Opinion and Order on Appeal, Page 4, Section A. Accordingly, the
assessment of attorney fees in the amount of $10,314.50 against the Appellant interest in
the Estate was reversed by the District Court. Additionally, the Judgment issued against
Appellant in favor of Linda Bailey on January 20, 2017 was vacated. The addition sums
assessed against Appellant's Estate interests in the Closing Order should be vacated for the
same reasons.
Idaho Code § 15-3-720

The Magistrate Court improperly interpreted Idaho Code§ 15-3-720 as allowing
for the assessment of attorney fees against the Appellant. On appeal the District Court
found that the "Supplemental Order [Regarding Attorney Fees] [which] attempted to cure
the errors made in the Order Granting In Substantial Part The Personal Representative's
Petition For Orders Filed 5/17/2016 by attempting to assess the attorney fees pursuant to
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Idaho Code§ 15-3-720." Opinion and Order on Appeal. Page 4, Last Paragraph.

"If any personal representative or person nominated as personal representative

defends or prosecutes any proceeding in good faith, whether successful or not, he is
entitled to receive from the estate his necessary expenses and disbursements including
reasonable attorney's fees incurred." Idaho Code§ 15-3-720

The District Court correctly interpreted Idaho Code § 15-3-720 as," ... allow[ing]
the Personal Representative to be reimbursed for attorney fees incurred while representing
the estate,'' Opinion and Order on Appeal, Page 5, Paragraph 1, and not as statutorial
grounds for assessing attorney fees against Appellant. The District Court then reversed
this second incorrect statutorial basis, Idaho Code § 15-3-720, put forward by the
Magistrate Court. The District Court found that, "it was an abuse of discretion for Judge
Riddoch to assess [attorney] fees against Appellant's interest in the estate under equity
and/or Idaho Code§ 15-3-720." Opinion and Order on Appeal, Page 5, Paragraph 2.
Therefore, the Magistrate Court improperly interpreted Idaho Code § 15-3-720 as allowing
for the assessment of attorney fees against the Appellant.
The PR may argue that she is entitled to attorney fees under other statutes or rules,
however, the time for asserting grounds in support of the Magistrates erroneous orders has
passed. The Court of Appeals ofldaho concluded;
As a reviewing court, however, our task is not to search out statutory support for
the award of fees below. Such support must be garnered by court and counsel at
the time the award is requested and made. Therefore, the award of attorney fees
must be vacated." Fournier v. Fourner, 125 Idaho 789,847 P.2d 600 (Idaho App.
APPELLANT'S BRIEF - 11

1994)

The record before this Court reflects that neither the Magistrate or District Court
found or concluded that the fees and costs set forth in PR's Memorandum were
contractually or statutorily based, that the Magistrate had set the sums due and owing or
than an order awarding fees was entered.
C.

FAILURE TO OBJECT TO THE MEMORANDUM OF FEES AND COSTS IS
NOT A SUFFICIENT BASIS TO GRANT THE A WARDING OF ATTORNEY
FEES.
As the Magistrate did not award legal fees, the District Court mischaracterized the

Magistrate's assessment of those sums set forth in the PR's memorandum of fees and costs
and thus erred in affirming the Magistrate's "award" assessment oflegal fees in the sum of
$10,521.00. "When reviewing an exercise of discretion, an appellate court must determine
whether the lower court properly applied the legal standard." Estate o{Kunzler, 109 Idaho
350 at 354, 707 P.2d 461 at 465 (App. 1985).
I.R.C.P. Rule 54(e)(7) states: "Any claim for attorney fees, including claims
pursuant to Idaho Code section 12-121, must be made pursuant to Rule 54(e) unless an
applicable statute or contract provides otherwise." (Emphasis added.) The District Court
found error in the Magistrate Court's decision to assess attorney fees to the Respondent.
The District Judge wrongfully relied upon the fact that the, "Appellant did not timely
object to the memorandum of costs by filing a motion to disallow all or part of the fees and
has thus waived his objection to those costs," See Opinion and Order on Appeal, Page 6,
Second Paragraph, as grounds for affirming the assessment of $10,521.00 against the
Appellant.
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"It is the general rule that attorney's fees cannot be recovered in an action unless

authorized by statute or by express agreement of the parties. There are, however,
exceptions to this general rule, in the case of fraud, wilful wrong or gross negligence.,"
Barnes v. Hinton, l 03 Idaho 619, 621 ( 1982). These exceptions are not applicable to this
case. There exists no exception in statute or case law for an award of attorney fees based
solely upon the failure of a party to object to a memorandum of fees and costs. The Idaho
Court of Appeals determined that the failure to object to a memorandum of fees and costs
does not, in and of itself, result in an award of fees.
[T]he waiver of objections does not detract from the trial court's responsibility
to exercise sound discretion in ruling upon requests for attorney fees under J.C.
§ 12-121 and/or discretionary costs under Rule 54(d)(l)(D). Accordingly,
although the unions waived their right to take exception to the memorandum of
costs, it does not follow that the memorandum of costs was deemed approved in
its entirety and that a writ of execution could be issued thereon ....
In the less typical case, where the losing party does not object to the cost bill, the
court can, on its own initiative review the memorandum, as provided in Rule
54( d)( 1)(D), n. 2. supra, and make the same detern1inations. If the court neglects
to review the memorandum and fix the amount of costs, as in this case the
prevailing party can simply submit a proposed order fixing costs (and attorney
fees, where applicable) and request the court to enter the order. This request can
be made without notice to the losing party because objections are deemed waived
under 54(d)(6). However, in all events, the order entered by the Court must
reflect the judge's exercise of discretion as to those items which relate to
attorney fees under J.C. §12-121 and to discretionary costs under Rule
54(d)(l)(D). Such awards do not become automatic simply because they were
claimed and the opposing party fails to object .... (Emphasis added) Operating
Engineers Local Union 370 v. Goodwin Const. Co. Of Blackfoot, l 04 Idaho 83,
656 P.2d 144 (Idaho App. 1982)

As stated above, the Magistrate had the responsibility and the duty to review the

Memorandum and make findings as to their validity and allowance under Idaho
Statute. Such responsibility is addressed in Allison v. John Biggs. 121 Idaho 567, 826
APPELLANT'S BRIEF - 13

P.2d 916 (1992), wherein the Court stated:

Properly understood, "[a]ll costs and attorney fees approved by the court,"
LR.C.P. 54(d)(l)(F), refers to those costs and fees requested within the fourteen-day time
limit of I.R.C.P. 54(d)(5) and which are approved by the court as reasonable and as
having a statutory or contractual basis." (Emphasis Added) Id. at 570, Section II.

The Court also addressed how the Court is to fulfill this responsibility of approving
attorney fees:

The court must then follow the procedure outlined in Rule 54(d)(6), determine
which of the items claimed will be allowed, and decide the amount of the award.
After making this decision, the court can enter a supplemental order stating the
precise amount awarded. See e.g., St. John v. 0 'Reilly, 80 Idaho 429, 333 P.2d
467 (1958)." Operating Engineers, supra.

The Magistrate did not review and determine the validity of the assessed attorney
fees in the amount of $10,521.00. The PR could have submitted a proposed order
awarding fees and costs to the Estate. No such order was submitted. The proposed
Closing Order submitted to the Court could have contained language fixing costs and
awarding fees but it did not. The District Court erroneously concluded that Appellant's
failure to object to the Memorandum entitled the Estate to recover of fees and costs. The
Magistrate had the duty to review PR's Memorandum. He did not. The PR could have
submitted a proposed order awarding fees and costs to the Estate. No such order was
submitted. The proposed Closing Order submitted to the Court could have contained
language fixing costs and awarding fees but it did not.
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VIII. CONCLUSION
The Magistrate Court did not award attorney fees or costs to the Estate, the
Magistrate Court erroneously assessed legal fees against Appellant's interest in the Estate
and merely instructed the Personal Representative to make distributions of the estate assets
based on those assessments. Even ifthere had been such an award, it would be without
contractual or statutory basis.
The District Court erred in characterizing concluding that Appellant's failure to
object to PR's Memorandum entitled the Estate to recover from Appellant's estate interest
those fees and costs identified therein. The District Court erred in affirming as an "award"
of fees which was nothing more than an erroneous equitable assessment of fees against
Appellant's interest in the Estate.
The PR' s defense against this appeal lacks any legal basis. Appellant is entitled to
an award of attorney fees and costs herein.
Respectfully submitted this~ day of May, 2018.

Michael Moscnp
Attorney for Appellant
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